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THE NURSING HOME CRISIS:
VIEWS FROM A TRUSTEE IN THE NONPROFIT SECTOR
MARSHALL B. KAPP, J.D., M.P.H.*
With a few notable exceptions,' most of the public discussion and
debate regarding the present status and future prospects of the nurs-
ing home industry in the United States has been conducted in rather
politicized, adversarial language.2 Opinions expressed and policy pre-
scriptions recommended vary greatly depending on the particular,
generally self-interested, perspective of whomever is the speaker at the
time.3 Sides have been chosen (or assigned), and real or perceived
enemies demonized.4 Thus, at the outset of my entry into this battle-
ground, it is important to delineate the specific role through which I
shall attempt to contribute some reflections about this vital subject.
* Professor, Departments of Community Health and Psychiatry and Director, Office
of Geriatric Medicine & Gerontology, Wright State University School of Medicine; Member
of the adjunct faculty, University of Dayton School of Law. B.A. Johns Hopkins University,
J.D. (With Honors) George Washington University, M.P.H. Harvard School of Public
Health.
1. See, e.g., IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LONG-TERM CARE (Gooloo S. Wunderlich &
Peter Kohler eds., 2000).
2. See Eric M. Carlson, Siege Mentality: How the Defensive Attitude of the Long-Term Care
Industry is Perpetuating Poor Care and an Even Poorer Public Image, 31 McGEORGE L. REv. 749
(2000); Editorial, Nursing Home Challenge, ST. PETERSBERG TIMES, Nov. 5, 2000, at D.
A [Florida] state task force ought to look beyond simplistic approaches to nursing
home reform and shape a serious and comprehensive solution, not a lobbyist driven one.
Why are so many Florida nursing homes going bankrupt? And what should the state do
about it? Those questions-at the heart of the ongoing work of the state's Task Force on
the Availability and Affordability of Long-Term Care-are enormously complex, though
you would hardly know it from the testimony the panel has received thus far. Last week in
Tallahassee, as elsewhere, most witnesses offered up predictably simplistic and polarized
views...
3. See Lindsay Peterson, Battle Rages Over Proposal to Overhaul Elderly Care, TAMPA TRIB.,
Dec. 16, 2000, available in 2000 VATL 24607142 (quoting the reaction of "a Tampa lawyer
who has earned millions suing nursing homes" to a proposal to curtail lawsuits against
nursing homes: "'[t]his is a sellout to the industry. It's intended to harm residents of nurs-
ing homes and I will do everything in my power to stop it.'" (emphasis added)); Connecti-
cut Legal Services, e-mail message celebrating the collapse of Florida nursing home tort
reform proposals, sent to ELDERBAR@MAIL.ABANET.ORG (quoting Coalition to Protect
America's Elders, in turn quoting plaintiffs attorney Susan Guberman-Garcia (Dec. 20,
2000) ("Litigation is just another form of class struggle.")).
4. See, e.g., Stephen Nohlgren, Task Force Becomes Nursing Homes'Ally, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Dec. 15, 2000, at 1B (describing the "outrage" of plaintiffs' attorneys at a legisla-
tively established task force in Florida for "caving in to the industry").
VIEWS FROM THE NONPROFIT SECTOR
My contribution to this Symposium issue of the Journal is based
chiefly on my extensive personal experience as a member (and in one
instance past-Chair) of Boards of Trustees for two nonprofit nursing
homes, as a member of quality assurance committees at several other
nonprofit nursing homes, and as a member (and in a number of cases
past-Chair) of institutional ethics committees at a handful of similar
facilities. My remarks must be interpreted, of course, as those of one
person with firsthand experience in a few specific capacities within a
small number of nonprofit nursing homes in one geographical region
(Southwestern Ohio). However, my own limited hands-on exposure
to the realities of operating a nonprofit nursing home in the U.S. at
the beginning of a new millennium are supplemented by extensive
professional interest and involvement over more than the past two de-
cades in matters pertaining to both the governmental and private sec-
tor aspects of long term care public policy.'
The thrust of this article is that most of the factors that have con-
verged in the last few years to create a contemporary nursing home
"crisis"6 affect individual nonprofit nursing homes as seriously as they
impact the proprietary sector of the industry. I argue that the major-
ity of nonprofit nursing homes that are being challenged today to
make difficult choices with potentially far-reaching consequences, and
to operate radically differently in many respects than they have tradi-
tionally functioned, really are benevolent and mission-driven because
of their community ownership and the sense of altruistic commitment
and responsibility ordinarily present on the part of their governing
bodies. I agree with the editorialist who recently responded to a lead-
ing plaintiff attorney's boast of being out to "destroy the industry" be-
cause "[t]here are no good nursing homes," "[h]e is wrong. There
are bad ones. There are also many good and caring homes, particu-
larly the nonprofit ones."7
5. See Marshall B. Kapp, Quality of Care and Quality of Life in Nursing Facilities: What's
Regulation Got to Do With It?, 31 MCGEORGE L. REv. 707, 707-08 (2000) [hereinafter Qual-
ity]; Marshall B. Kapp, 'A Place Like That'" Advance Directives and Nursing Home Admissions, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 805, 805-08 (1998) [hereinafter Place]. See also generally Marshall
B. Kapp, Taking a Long Term View of Long-Term Care: Rightsizing Terms of the Discussion, I
QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 123 (1997); Marshall B. Kapp, Increasing Liability Risks Among Nurs-
ing Homes: Therapeutic Consequences, Costs, and Alternatives, 48 J. AM. GERIATRIC Soc' 97
(2000).
6. See generally Jane K. Straker et al., Ohio Nursing Homes: An Industy In Transition,
Scripps Gerontology Center, Miami University (1997) (regarding the challenges faced by
nursing homes at this moment).
7. Dudley Clendinen, The Crisis in Providing Care for the Elderly Ill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2,
2000, at 18A.
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Although this is an especially demanding time to be operating a
nursing home, either proprietary or nonprofit, from a broad social
policy viewpoint, several aspects of the current "crisis" are positive.
The major conundrum is finding effective ways to enhance and ex-
ploit those salutary developments without inadvertently mortally
wounding or destroying those parts of the traditional institutional
long term care system-in this instance, the valuable contributions of
nonprofit nursing homes in humanely serving older and disabled per-
sons in need-that ought to be preserved and even bolstered as a mat-
ter of the public's welfare.
I. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE PRESENT CRISIS
A number of sometimes independent and sometimes interrelated
factors have converged within the past few years to create an atmos-
phere within and surrounding the U.S. nursing home industry that
may justifiably be characterized as a current "crisis." Perhaps the most
powerful of these factors has been the development of tremendous,
unprecedented pressures on nursing homes in most parts of the
country to aggressively compete for "customers" to fill their (in many
cases, recently constructed) beds and thus to maintain their resident
censuses. Even for facilities that previously were able to enjoy the eco-
nomic luxury of maintaining waiting lists for admission, competition
comes now not only from other nursing homes, but also from the rap-
idly exploding assisted living industry,8 continuing care retirement
communities, and a slew of home and community-based services func-
tioning as preferred alternatives to institutional placement. Most per-
sons want to avoid or at least substantially delay their own
institutionalization if at all possible,9 and a combination of private and
public sector initiatives are proving increasingly successful in helping
even very frail and disabled persons to satisfy that objective."0
"[A] bout a quarter million elderly persons who, based on age and sex,
would have been in nursing homes in 1985 were not in nursing homes
in 1995. Nursing home residents... also looked different in 1995: Re-
8. See generally Is Assisted Living the Right Choice? 66 CONSUMER REPORTS, Jan. 2001, at
26; ASSISTED LMNG: CURRENT ISSUES IN FACILITY MANAGEMENT AND RESIDENT CARE (Kevan
H. Namazi & Paul K. Chafetz eds., 2000); JEREMY CITRO & SHARON HERMANSON, ASSISTED
LMNG IN THE UNITED STATES, AARP PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE (Fact Sheet 62R) (1999);
JAMES E. ALLEN, ASSISTED LMNG ADMINISTRATION: THE KNOWLEDGE BASE (1999); BENJAMIN
W. PEARCE, SENIOR LIVING COMMUNITIES: OPERATIONS, MANAGEMENT AND MARKETING FOR
ASSISTED LIVING, CONGREGATE, AND CONTINUING-CARE RETIREMENT COMMUNITIES (1998).
9. See Place, supra note 5, at 805-06.
10. See Jim DeBrosse & David Gulliver, Ohio's 'Super Seniors' Aren't Filling Up Nursing
Homes, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Aug. 30, 2000, at Al.
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sidents were older and more severely impaired. . .[by the time they
had to be admitted].""
The states are being especially prodded to develop and support a
range of home and community-based alternatives to institutional
placement for the disabled, including older disabled individuals, 12
under the mandate of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act13 in the Olmstead case, 4 as that deci-
sion is being vigorously enforced by the federal Health Care Financ-
ing Administration (HCFA). 15 According to one author, "whether
there will be an increase in home and community-based services and
changes in state long-term care systems is not a question. It is a con-
clusion."' 6 The allure of potential cost savings from the use of home
and community-based alternatives to nursing homes also gives the
states an incentive to move in that direction. 17
The pharmaceutical industry is beginning to experience notable
success in developing drugs that effectively treat some of the symp-
toms of dementia in certain patients.1 8 These successes are also play-
11. Judith Feder et al., Long-Term Care in the United States: An Overview, 19 HEALTH AFF.
40, 46 (2000). See also WILLIAM D. SPECTOR &JOHN A. FLEISHMAN ET AL., THE CHARACTERIS-
TICS OF LONG-TERM CARE USERS, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY Pub.
No. 00-0049 (Sept. 2000).
12. See SARA ROSENBAUM, AM. ASS'N OF RETIRED PERSONS, OLMSTEAD v. L.C.: IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR OLDER PERSONS WITH MENTAL AND PHYSICAL DISABILITIES, PUBLIC POLICY INSTI-
TUTE REPORT #2000-21 (Nov. 2000).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213.
14. Olmstead v. Zimring, 119 S.Ct. 2176, 2178 (1999). See Bazelon Center for Mental
Health Law, Under Court Order: What the Community Integration Mandate Means for People with
Mental Illness (visited Feb. 7, 2001) <http://www.webcom.com/bazelon/Icruling.html>.'
Nat'l Ass'n of Protection and Advocacy Sys., Olmstead Progress Report: Disability Advocates As-
sess State Implementation After One Year (visited Feb. 7, 2001) <http://
www.protectionandadvocacy.com/progressreportfinal.htm>. But see Paul S. Applebaum,
Least Restrictive Alternative Revisited: Olmstead's Uncertain Mandate for Community-Based Care, 40
PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 1271, 1272 (1999) (expressing doubts about the actual impact the Olin-
stead decision will have).
15. The Department of Health and Human Services has set up a Working Group for
ADA/Olmstead, staffed through the Health Care Financing Administration Center for
Medicaid and State Operations. Information is available at <http://www.hcfa.gov/medi-
caid/olmstead/olmshome>.
16. LINDA VELGOUSE, AM. ASS'N OF HOMES AND SERVICES FOR THE AGING, THE OLMSTEAD
DECISION: RESPONSES AND IMPACT, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BRIEF 17 (2000).
17. See generally LISA MARIA B. ALECXIH ET AL., ESTIMATED COST SAVINGS FROM THE USE
OF HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED ALTERNATIVES TO NURSING FACILITY CARE IN THREE STATES
(1996).
18. See generally Barbara B. Sherwin, Mild Cognitive Impairment: Potential Pharmacological
Treatment Options, 48 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC'y 431 (2000); Richard Mayeux & Mary Sano,
Treatment of Alzheimer's Disease, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1670 (1999); Rebecca M. Evans &
Martin Farlow, Drug Therapies for Alzheimer's Disease, 6 HOME HEALTH CARE CONSULTANT 11
(May 1999). See also Marshall B. Kapp, Physicians' Legal Duties Regarding the Use of Genetic
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ing a role in delaying or avoiding nursing home admission for some
persons who only a few short years ago certainly would have required
institutionalization sooner.
Another factor contributing to the sense of crisis is a strong per-
ception that the extensive, omnipresent legislative 9 and regulatory
environments that have enveloped nursing home practice for more
than thirty years have lately, and in the future will increasingly, be-
come even more aggressive,2 ° focused on punitive enforcement,21 and
unpredictable.22 "Satisfying the regulators and caring for sicker, less
stable patients should make nursing home management even more
challenging."23 Besides their longstanding discomfort about regula-
tory sanctions being imposed as part of the required licensure and
Medicaid survey and certification processes,24 nursing homes now are
confronted by the realistic possibility of criminal prosecutions for pro-
viding sub-optimal levels of quality of care. Criminal indictments may
be initiated by local prosecutors under authority of state elder abuse
and neglect statutes25 and/or by federal prosecutors, in collaboration
with the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Inspec-
Tests to Predict and Diagnose Alzheimer's Disease, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 445, 459-60 (2000) and
sources cited therein.
19. See, e.g., Nursing Home Staffing Improvement Act of 2000, H.R. 5646, 106' Cong.
(2000); Nursing Staff Accountability and Training Improvement Act of 2000, H.R. 4614,
1 0 6th Cong. (2000); The Nursing Home Quality Protection Act, H.R. 4949, 1 0 6 h Cong.
(2000).
20. See Elaine C. Zacharakis, Increased Federal Enforcement of Nursing Homes Expected, 11
HEALTH LAWYER 12, nII- n.3 (1999).
21. See Robert Pear, US. Toughens Enforcement of Nursing Home Standards, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 4, 2000, at 21; see also generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NURSING HOMES: SUC-
CESS OF QUALITY INITIATIVES REQUIRES SUSTAINED FEDERAL AND STATE COMMITMENT, GAO/
T-HEHS-00-209 (2000); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NURSING HOMES: SUSTAINED EF-
FORTS ARE ESSENTIAL TO REALIZE POTENTIAL OF THE QUALITY INITIATIVES, GAO/HEHS-00-
197 (2000). For an advocacy agency's complaint that the 1999 revisions to the Medicaid
State Operations Manual (SOM), available at <http://www.hcfa.gov/pubforms/progman>,
do not go far enough in the punitive direction, see Toby S. Edelman, The New Enforcement
System, 2000 NURSING HOME L. LETrER 17 (2000).
22. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Drexler, Letter, Guidance to Surveyors-Long-Term Care Facilities:
Angry Comments from One Down in the Trenches, 48J. AM. GERIATRIC Soc'v 103, 104 (2000)
(protesting "the government bureaucrats who will be sending mindless government robots
out to survey").
23. David R. Graber & David M. Ward, Nursing Home Organization and Operations, in
HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ADMINISTRATION AND POLICY 339, 351 (Anne 0. Kilpatrick & James
A. Johnson eds. 1999).
24. See JAMES E. ALLEN, NURSING HOME FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES To
SURVEYORS (4' ed. 1999).
25. See generally Andrew Julien, Arrests Rattle Care Industry, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 7,
2000, at B1.
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tor General,26 based on the theory that a nursing home that bills the
Medicare or Medicaid programs for payments when the care provided
was inadequate has attempted to defraud the government and hence
violated the False Claims Act.
27
Until relatively recently, private civil lawsuits brought by or on
behalf of individual residents against specific facilities and/or their
staff members alleging professional malpractice were rare enough to
be not much of a factor contributing to nursing homes' anxieties.28
For a variety of reasons, this part of the picture has changed dramati-
cally lately. As the plaintiffs' personal injury bar has discovered this
potentially lucrative arena29 and closely joined forces with nursing
home residents' advocates, consumer groups,3 ° and regulators, the
number of civil malpractice as well as private False Claims Act qui
tam3 t actions being filed against nursing homes has escalated tremen-
26. The Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General has
announced its intention to devote an increasingly substantial amount of attention to assess-
ing the quality of care in nursing homes, a development that adds to the sense of besiege-
ment from without felt by the nursing home industry. See Fiscal Year 2001 President's Budget
Request for the Health Care Financing Administration: Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on
Labor-HHS-Education Appropriations (statement of Nancy-Ann DeParle, Administrator,
HCFA).
27. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3732. See John R. Munich & Elizabeth W. Lane, When Neglect
Becomes Fraud: Quality of Care and False Claims, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 27, 35 (1999); Angela S.
Quin, Imposing Federal Criminal Liability on Nursing Homes: A Way of Deterring Inadequate
Health Care and Improving the Quality of Care Delivered?, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 653, 668 (1999);
David R. Hoffman, The Role of the Federal Government in Ensuring Quality of Care in Long-Term
Care Facilities, 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 147, 147-48 (1997); United States v. GMS Management-
Tucker, No. 96-1271 (E.D. Pa., Feb. 21, 1996) ($600,000 settlement). For a criticism of the
government's use of the False Claims Act to try to enforce quality standards in nursing
homes, see Michael M. Mustokoff et al., The Government's Use of the Civil False Claims Act to
Enforce Standards of Quality of Care: Ingenuity or the Heavy Hand of the 800-Pound Gorilla, 6
ANNALS HEALTH L. 137, 141-42 (1997).
28. See Marshall B. Kapp & Ronald Markert, Legal Risk Management Programs in Nursing
Homes: Who Has Them and Do They Work?, 35 Hosp. & HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN. 603, 604
(1990); Marshall B. Kapp, A Survey of State Medicaid Policies on Nursing Home Legal Risk Man-
agement Programs, 10 PERSPECTIVES HEALTHCARE RISK MGT. 8, 8 (1990).
29. See, e.g., NURSING HOME LITIGATION: INVESTIGATION AND CASE PREPARATION 10 (Pa-
tricia W. Iyer ed.) (1999); Steven M. Levin & Janice F. Mulligan, Litigating Nursing Home
Wandering Cases, 2 ELDER'S ADVISOR 9, 10 (Fall 2000); see also generally Cheryl C. Mitchell &
Ferd H. Mitchell, Handling Tort Recoveries for Persons Over and Under Age 65, 2 ELDER'S ADvi-
SOR 62 (Fall 2000).
30. Regarding the consumer movement in the long term care sphere, see generally GARY
R. ILMINEN, CONSUMER GUIDE To LONG-TERM CARE (1999).
31. 31 U.S.C. § 3730. See John M. Parisi, A Weapon Against Nursing Home Fraud and
Abuse: Using the Federal Civil False Claims Act, Plaintiff Attorneys Can Fight Fraud and Ensure
that Nursing Home Residents Who Receive Federal Benefits Get the Care They Need, 35 TRIAL 48, 48
(1999); Constantinos I. Miskis, Enforcing Quality Standards in Long-Term Care: The False
Claims Act and Other Remedies, 73 FLA. B.J. 108, 109 (1999); see generally Leon Aussprung,
Fraud and Abuse: Federal Civil Health Care Litigation and Settlement, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 1 (1998).
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dously.32 An increasing number of these cases have resulted in sub-
stantial monetary judgments against the defendants, often including
awards of punitive damages, 33 or settlements. 3 4 In a logical response
to these circumstances, liability insurance carriers in high risk geo-
graphic areas such as Florida35 have begun to raise premium rates
considerably or withdraw from the nursing home marketplace
altogether.
At the same time that these other factors are exerting their influ-
ence, nursing homes nationally also are being compelled to confront
a severe shortage of nurses, certified nursing assistants, and other
workers who are prepared and willing to be employed in nursing
homes caring for residents. 6 Almost universal difficulties in recruit-
ing and retaining qualified nursing home personnel from administra-
tors3 7 to line staff," and thus in maintaining minimal39 let alone
32. "There is a torrent of new activity surrounding nursing home litigation in the
United States. Claims against nursing homes and assisted living facilities have increased 9
percent each year over the last five years with charges of improper nutrition, medication
errors, emotional abuse, and more." Brochure advertising Mealey's Nursing Home Litiga-
tion Conference on Jan. 24-25, 2001 in Naples, FL.
33. Rhodes v. HEB Nursing Home, Tex. Dist. Ct., Tarrant County (Oct. 15, 1998)
($250 million in punitive damages awarded); Texas Jury Finds Beverly, Inc. Responsible for
Neglect, Fraud in $83 Million Judgment, NCCNHR QUALITY CARE ADVOCATE I (Fall 1997)
($70 million punitive damage award); Donald C. Dilworth, Negligent Nursing Home Care
Triggers Juror Outrage, 34 TRIAL 16, 16 (1998).
34. See Record Year for Plaintiffs' Attorneys in Nursing Home Litigation, ANDREWS NURSING
HOME LITIGATION REPORTER 1 (Dec. 16, 1999); Edward Felsenthal, Juy Awards Rise for Im-
proper Care of Elderly, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 1995, at BI.
35. Regarding the nursing home malpractice environment in Florida, see generally Di-
ane C. Lade, Study Finds Most Nursing Home Lawsuits in Florida Have Merit, FT. LAUDERDALE
SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 6, 2000, at IB; Mary Ellen Klas, State Warns 29 Facilities to Get Insurance,
PALM BEACH POST, Dec. 19, 2000, at 8A (". . Florida nursing homes face three times as
many lawsuits as homes in the rest of the nation. The average cost of damages and liability
insurance per bed is $6,282, compared with $809 in other states.");Jennifer L. Williamson,
The Siren Sound of the Elderly: Norida's Nursing Homes and the Dark Side of Chapter 400, 25 Am.
J.L. & MED. 423, 440 (1999).
36. See Julia Malone, Clinton Pushes Nursing Home Jobs, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Sept. 17,
2000, at IA ("The Health and Human Services Department says more than half of nursing
homes are dangerously understaffed."); William E. Even et al., Long-Term Care Staffing
Needs for Older People in Ohio, Scripps Gerontology Center (1998).
37. See Douglas A. Singh & Robert C. Schwab, Retention of Administrators in Nursing
Homes: What Can Management Do?, 38 THE GERONTOLOGIST 362, 368 (1998).
38. See generally JANE K STRAKER & ROBERT C. ATCHLEY, SCRIPPS GERONTOLOGY CENTER,
RECRUITING AND RETAINING FRONTLINE WORKERS IN LONG-TERM CARE: USUAL ORGANIZA-
TIONAL PRACTICES IN OHIO (1999); see KARL PILLEMER, SOLVING THE FRONTLINE CRISIS IN
LONG-TERM CARE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE To FINDING AND KEEPING QUALITY NURSING ASSIST-
ANTS (1996).
39. See HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, REPORT To CONGRESS - APPROPRIATE-
NESS OF MINIMUM NURSE STAFFING RATIOS IN NURSING HOMES (Summer 2000); Charlene
Harrington et al., Experts Recommend Minimum Nurse Staffing Standards for Nursing Facilities in
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desirable staffing levels, is a problem with serious financial, quality of
care, marketing,4" and regulatory compliance ramifications.
All of the foregoing problems are exacerbated by the loud and
constant assault on the image of the nursing home industry as a
whole, and on the competence and integrity of specific facilities and
their staffs, carried out by the national and local print and.electronic
media,4 frequently in collaboration with residents' advocates, regula-
tors, and politicians.42 A seemingly unending and often sensationalist
serving of scandals and horror stories about bad institutional condi-
tions and misdeeds is voraciously consumed by the public, fueling en-
ergy for even more desperation by the public to avoid nursing home
admission, the promulgation of all-encompassing regulation, and dis-
couragement of potential workers from accepting employment in this
part of the health care enterprise.
Finally (although this listing of factors does not purport to be
comprehensive), constraints imposed by the Balanced Budget Act
(BBA) of 19974" on Medicare44 and Medicaid 45 payment rates, cou-
the United States, 40 THE GERONTOLOGIST 5, 14 (2000); National Citizens' Coalition for Nurs-
ing Home Reform, Federal & State Minimum Staffing Requirements for Nursing Homes:
December 1999 (visited Mar. 7, 2001) <http://www.nccnhr.org/Updates/Fed-
eralandStateMinimumStaffing.htm>. But see Charlene Harrington et al., Nursing Home
Staffing and Its Relationship to Deficiencies, 55 J. GERONTOLOGY. SOCIAL SCI. S278, S284 (2000)
(concluding that nursing home characteristics and geographic location are stronger
predictors of nursing home care deficiencies than staffing hours).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(b) provides:
8) (A) A skilled nursing facility shall post daily for each shift the current number
of licensed and unlicensed nursing staff directly responsible for resident care in
the facility. The information shall be displayed in a uniform manner (as specified
by the Secretary) and in a clearly visible place.
(B) A skilled nursing facility shall, upon request, make available to the public the
nursing staff data described in subparagraph (A).
41. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Shock, But No Longer Surprise Over Nursing Home Problems,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2000, at D1; Jim DeBrosse & David Gulliver, Penalties Few For Poor Care,
DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Dec. 6, 1999, at Al; Jim DeBrosse & David Gulliver, Frail Elderly at
Mercy of System, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Dec. 5, 1999, at Al.
42. See Robert Pear, Congressional Investigators Cite Safety Violations at Nursing Homes, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2000, at A24; MINORITY STAFF, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DISION, COMMIrEE
ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, NURSING HOMES IN CHICAGO:
MANY HOMES FAIL TO MEET FEDERAL STANDARDS FOR ADEQUATE CARE 2-3 (Mar. 27, 2000).
But see AM. HEALTH CARE ASS'N, REPORT PAINTS DISTORTED PICTURE OF THE QUALITY OF
SKILLED NURSING CARE (Apr. 5, 2000) (refuting accuracy of a Congressional report on the
quality of nursing care).
43. Pub. L. No. 105-33, 1997 HR 2015.
44. Under the BBA, Congress converted skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) to a prospec-
tive payment system (PPS) from the historic retrospective cost-based reimbursement sys-
tem. Under PPS, Medicare payments to SNFs are divorced from specific allowable costs
the SNFs incurred to furnish services to Medicare beneficiaries and instead are based ex-
clusively on prospective rates unilaterally established by HCFA. Regarding the practical
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pled with stiff public reluctance so far to embrace the concept of pri-
vate long term care insurance46 despite support for this concept from
the federal and state governments, 47 color darkly the financial climate
within which the nursing home industry operates. The cause and ef-
fect relationship, if any, between government payment rates (versus
other possible explanations such as overexpansion by the industry) 41
and the current financial instability of many nursing homes is a matter
of considerable controversy,49 but the existence of that instability is
not.50 Congress attempted to provide some relief, and thereby im-
prove resident access to and the quality of nursing home care, by en-
acting the Balanced Budget Refinement Act (BBRA) of 199951 to
increase the payment rate for care of the frailest older skilled nursing
impact of this and other changes made by the BBA, seeJanelle Carter, Cuts Hurt Nursing
Facilities, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Sept. 6, 2000, at 3A.
45. The Boren Amendment, previously codified at 42 CFR § 447.253(b)(1)(i), had re-
quired that states establish Medicaid payment rates for nursing homes that were reasona-
ble and adequate, and met the costs that efficiently and economically operated facilities
incurred to furnish services. The BBA repealed the Boren Amendment and authorized
states to develop their own substantive standards, using their own methodologies, to set
payment rates.
46. On the limited present role of private long term care insurance, see NAT'L ACADEMY
OF ELDER LAW ArTORNEYS, WHITE PAPER ON REFORMING THE DELIVERY, ACCESSIBILITY AND
FINANCING OF LONG-TERM CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 6, 9, 12-18 (2000); Feder et al., supra
note 12, at 45.
47. See Joshua M. Wiener et al., Federal and State Initiatives to Jump Start the Market for
Private Long-Term Care Insurance, 8 ELDER LJ. 57, 63 (2000).
48. See Debra Sparks, On the Sick List: Nursing Homes, Street Darlings of the '90s, Have Been
Laid Low, Bus. WK., July 5, 1999, at 68.
49. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NURSING HOMES: AGGREGATE MEDICARE
PAYMENTS ARE ADEQUATE DESPITE BANKRUPTCIES, GAO/T-HEHS-00-192 (2000); Hearing on
Medicare Balanced Budget Act Refinements: Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Health of the
House Committee on Ways and Means (Oct. 1, 1999) (statement of William J. Scanlon); U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE: BETTER INFORMATION CAN HELP ENSURE THAT REFINE-
MENTS TO BBA REFORMS LEAD TO APPROPRIATE PAYMENTS, GAO/T- HEHS-00-14 (1999):
Our ongoing work suggests that factors in addition to the PPS have contributed to
fiscal difficulties for some corporations operating SNFs. Nevertheless, certain
modifications to the PPS may be appropriate to ensure that payments are
targeted to patients who require more costly care. The potential access problems
that may result if Medicare underpays for high-cost cases could lead to benefi-
ciaries' staying in acute care hospitals longer, rather than foregoing care alto-
gether. Id., at 2-3.
50. SeeJerry Ackerman, CareMatrix Seeks Bankruptcy Protection, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 10,
2000, at D4; Scott D. Horsburgh, 18-Month Review-Manor Care, Inc., BETTER INVESTING, Sept.
2000, at 44 (describing the nursing home industry's financial problems); Julia Malone,
Nation's Nursing Homes Need $2 Billion in Federal Aid, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Sept. 3, 2000, at
8A.
51. Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501
(1999).
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facility (SNF) residents, but the real impact of this BBRA remains-to
be seen at this time.
52
II. EFFECTS ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR
The lion's share of the public commentary expressed thus far re-
garding the challenging circumstances confronting modern American
nursing homes has focused on the roughly three-quarters 53 of the in-
dustry characterized by investor, or proprietary, for-profit ownership.
At its most vituperative, this commentary consists essentially of con-
sumer advocates reflexively condemning anything connected to a cap-
italist marketplace approach to health and human services, accusing
nursing home corporations of purposefully sacrificing quality of resi-
dent care in order to maximize short term shareholder profits, and
the proprietary sector of the industry indeed focusing its energies and
complaints mainly on payment rates, malpractice insurance premi-
ums, the costs of regulatory compliance, and other matters pertaining
to the industry's own economic bottom line.
A vital factor that has been largely overlooked amidst the barrage
of complementary insults and accusations flowing between consumer
advocacy groups and the proprietary trade associations is the real and
potential impact of the developments enumerated in the previous sec-
tion on the continued vitality and viability of nonprofit nursing
homes. In light of the proliferation of home and community based
long term care alternatives 54 and assisted living facilities5 5 that enable
persons to avoid or substantially delay entry into a nursing home, non-
profit nursing homes feel the financial pinch of vigorous competition
just as painfully as does the proprietary sector. Older and disabled
individuals are no more anxious to be admitted to a nonprofit nursing
home than a proprietary one if there is another real choice. Moreo-
ver, nonprofit facilities generally do not have available to them the
marketing budgets that most proprietary chains expend to pursue
their scramble to find and enroll new residents.
The federal, state, and local regulatory environment affects non-
profit and proprietary nursing homes in exactly the same ways.
52. See Susan C. Emmer, How the Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999 Will Affect Geriat-
ric Medicine, 48J. AM. GERIATRIC Soc'v 450, 451 (2000).
53. See Graber & Ward, supra note 24, at 341; Nursing Homes: When a Loved One Needs
Care, CONSUMER REP., Aug. 1995, at 519.
54. In 1998, about eight million Americans received medical and personal care services
from more than 20,000 home health care agencies and hospices. See NATALIE G. TUCKER ET
AL., LONG-TERM CARE, AARPP PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE FACT SHEET 27R, at 1 (May 2000).
55. In 1998, an estimated 600,000 people were living in about 28,000 assisted living
facilities. See id.
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Neither the survey and certification nor licensure processes, local
prosecutors, nor the Office of Inspector General give any special
favorable consideration or advantage to nonprofit facilities; the same
substantive rules and administrative procedures apply with full force
regardless of a facility's ownership status. Similarly, neither tort doc-
trine, plaintiffs' personal injury attorneys, nor professional liability in-
surance underwriters draw any distinction between nonprofit and
proprietary nursing homes (although it is conceivable that juries
might take a nursing home's ownership status into account in consid-
ering whether, and to what extent, to award punitive damages).
Likewise, minimum staffing ratio requirements do not offer any
dispensation for nonprofit status, and recruiting and retaining quali-
fied staff is no easier for nonprofit than proprietary nursing homes.
Few, if any, current or potential nursing home employees are swayed
in their job choice by a facility's ownership status. Further, nonprofit
nursing homes are by no means exempted from negative media atten-
tion, and their reputations and morale levels are tarnished by such
reports to at least as great a degree as occurs in the case of proprietary
facilities. Finally, Medicare and Medicaid payment rates are no more
generous for nonprofit nursing homes than for their proprietary
counterparts, and there is no evidence that residents of nonprofit
nursing homes are especially likely to have purchased private long
term care insurance policies.
III. WHY THE IMPACT ON NONPROFIT NURSING HOMES MATTERS
The fact that the nonprofit sector of the nursing home industry
joins its proprietary counterpart in experiencing many aspects of the
current crisis ought to matter deeply to those who purport to be con-
cerned about the quality of care and quality of life available to older
and disabled persons who need long term care services. Assuming
that one accepts a continuing need for the availability of some institu-
tional long term care options, most nonprofit nursing homes ought to
be recognized and supported as valuable participants who represent
an essential middle ground between an arguably excessively finan-
cially driven proprietary industry, on one hand, and the nihilistic ser-
vice vacuum that would neglect and imperil the most vulnerable
members of society, on the other, if nursing homes ceased to exist
altogether.
In my own experience and observation, the governing boards of
most nonprofit nursing homes are overwhelmingly guided by the
stated benevolent mission of the institution. Members of these facili-
ties' boards of trustees have no motivation to volunteer their time,
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energy, and often financial contributions to this form of non-compen-
sated community service other than a sincere commitment to the par-
ticular institutional mission. Dedication to the welfare of the specific
community that owns and is served by the nonprofit nursing home is
an attitude that permeates the institution from the governance level
through the lowliest employee on the institution's organization chart.
The vast majority of nonprofit nursing homes would be delighted to
offer residents more and higher caliber staffing, nicer and newer phys-
ical plants, a wider and more continuous range of constructive activi-
ties, and all the other things that contribute to an enhanced quality of
care and quality of life, if only available resources-both financial and
human-permitted them to do so.
This overarching commitment to a benevolent mission causes
nonprofit nursing homes to maintain a sense of moral responsibility
to their respective communities-religious,56 fraternal, or other. At
the same time, excessive naivete among nonprofit nursing home gov-
erning bodies about the current realities described earlier will inevita-
bly threaten a facility's long range financial capacity to continue
carrying out its benevolent mission. While nonprofit facilities may
seek out philanthropic donors (a task which, itself, is becoming ever
more competitive), they lack the ability to generate capital from inves-
tors. The ultimate irony is that the combination of growing competi-
tiveness for residents, an unfriendly regulatory and litigation
environment, the severe shortage of qualified labor, hostile media
treatment, and a very cost conscious third-party payer climate is, prob-
ably too frequently, compelling nonprofit nursing homes to behave in
a more businesslike and less benevolent fashion, and thus to become
less and less distinguishable from their proprietary counterparts on
both a strategic and an everyday activities basis.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY
Certainly, a number of the factors contributing to the current
nursing home crisis have brought about positive ramifications. Keep-
ing people out of nursing homes-proprietary or nonprofit-as long as
possible is an accomplishment to be broadly applauded and en-
couraged, as long as the individuals being diverted from long term
care institutions are receiving the help they need and are not simply
being neglected. Society ought to support expansion of home and
56. See UNITED JEWiSH COMMUNITIES, LONG TERM CARE SERVICES IN THE NEW M.ARKET-
PLACE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE JEWISH COMMUNITY (1999); Marshall B. Kapp, Ethical Chal-
lenges for Jewish Long Term Care Providers, 9J. RELIGIOUS GERONTOLOGY 21, 22 (1994).
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community-based long term care options, particularly those based on
the principle of maximizing consumer choice and control over the
service package.57
Nonprofit agencies and their community owners should be in the
forefront of this diversification, 5 not just because new product lines
and profit centers are needed for financial survival, let alone prosper-
ing (although financial viability is both a relevant and legitimate con-
sideration), but because home and community-based long term care
options respond to what members of the communities that nonprofit
agencies exist to serve prefer in their lives. The major trade associa-
tion representing nonprofit long term care providers has suggested,
"providers will also want to examine the new opportunities Olmstead
affords for expanding their home and community-based services or
for starting an HCBS program. This type of community outreach of-
fers prospects for providers on many levels."5
There is another positive note to the current situation. Real
fraud, abuse, and waste does take place in public payment programs,
and it is difficult to criticize aggressive attempts by the government to
eliminate its negative effects.
Those salutary developments notwithstanding, the present crisis
places the U.S.6" at a crossroads in terms of deciding what role, if any,
the populace expects nursing homes to play in the larger national
long term care marketplace/system in the future. The answer that
probably is not viable, and assuredly is not desirable, is a continuation
of the current process of slow demise, confusion, and uncertainty be-
ing experienced by both the proprietary and nonprofit sectors of the
57. Regarding consumer choice and control in home and community-based long term
care services, see MARSHALL B. KAPP, SCRIPPS GERONTOLOGY CENTER, CONSUMER CHOICE IN
HOME AND COMMUNrIY-BASED LONG TERM CARE: POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR DECISIONALLY
INCAPACITATED CONSUMERS (2000); Robyn Stone, guest ed., Theme Issue: Consumer Direction
in Long-Term Care, XXIV GENERATIONS 3, 21 (Fall 2000).
58. "In both 1987 and 1996, the for-profit segment of the nursing home market was
nearly entirely represented by nursing homes with only nursing home beds, as opposed to
other more organizationally complex nursing home types (nursing homes with affiliated
non-nursing home beds and hospital-based nursing homes). Nonprofit and government
facilities were more likely than for-profit facilities to have affiliated non-nursing beds, such
as assisted or independent living beds." SeeJEFFREY A. RHODES & NANCY A. KRAUSS, AGENCY
FOR HEALTH CARE POL'Y AND RESEARCH PUB. No. 99-0032, NURSING HOME TRENDS, 1987
AND 1996 (1999).
59. VELGOUSE, supra note 16, at 17.
60. Delineating long term care policy is actually an international, not just a U.S., chal-
lenge. See TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS ON POLICY FOR LONG-TERM CARE OF THE
AGING, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION AND MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND (2000) (proposing
eight priority issues and guiding principles).
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nursing home industry. The more feasible policy alternatives divide
into two basic approaches.
Under one approach, we could decide to discontinue allowing
nursing homes to participate in Medicare and Medicaid programs or
to otherwise receive public (e.g., Department of Veterans Affairs) 6
payments for providing nursing home services. Any nursing homes
remaining in business would have to survive on a combination of pri-
vate pay residents,62 private long term care insurance, and charitable
donations. In such a scenario, it is likely that most remaining nursing
homes would be proprietary and even more focused on bottom line
financial returns. Absent involvement of governmental purse strings,
the legal justification for regulatory intrusion into nursing home oper-
ations would be greatly diminished.6" Prohibiting nursing homes that
do not participate in public financing programs from discriminating
in resident admissions and retention on the basis of ability to pay,
even if legally permissible,64 surely would-whether consciously in-
tended to do so or not-put a quick and complete end to the Ameri-
can nursing home industry.
If a vast reduction in the number, if not total elimination, of nurs-
ing homes is the desired practical outcome, the nation had better be
exceedingly committed to accomplishing the following: infusing sub-
stantial financial resources into expansion of home and community-
based long term care options and assisted living; administering those
non-institutional or quasi-institutional service programs soundly and
efficiently; developing, finding, cultivating, and retaining suitable
workers for those programs; and accepting the inevitability that some
long term care clients will be at substantial risk of undetected neglect
or even abuse and exploitation when relying on services provided in
61. 38 U.S.C. § 1720.
62. In 1998, the average annual cost of care in a nursing home was about $56,000. See
TuCKER ET. AL., supra note 5E, at 1. In 1998, out-of-pocket spending for nursing home care
totaled $28.5 billion, or one-third of all nursing home expenditures. See id. at 2.
63. For example, the federal government currently regulates nursing homes under the
constitutional Taxing and Spending Power, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, as a consequence of
Medicare and Medicaid program involvement.
64. Cf Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd
(1997). EMTALA requires hospital emergency departments to evaluate, and if necessary
treat at least to the point of stabilization, all presenting patients without regard to their
insurance status or ability to pay, but this act applies only to hospitals receiving Medicare
payments. Since the U.S. Constitution does not guarantee anyone a right to funds for
health care generally, see, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), rehearing denied 448
U.S. 917 (1980), it would be difficult to argue credibly for a right to long term care unless
Congress or the states had created one legislatively.
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relatively unmonitored or ineffectively monitored65 home and com-
munity-based or assisted living66 environments.
Each of the approximately 1.6 million persons who presently re-
side in around 17,000 nursing homes67 would need to be cared for
somewhere, by someone; more than four-fifths of these individuals re-
quire help with three or more activities of daily living, such as bathing,
dressing, toileting, transferring from a bed or chair, feeding, and mo-
bility.6" As one leading geriatrician has put it, "In this day of 'sicker
and quicker' transfer of patients from hospitals to nursing homes, it is
rare to find a nursing home resident who does not need nursing
home care. I have never met a malingerer living in a nursing
home."69 In the idealistic scenario posited here- a world without
nursing homes70-nonprofit, mission-driven organizations should be
given financial and other kinds of incentives to be even more active
competitors in the home and community-based long term care and
assisted living marketplaces to help them meet the challenge. Other-
wise, we may be fated to see repeated some version of the massive
social problems created by deinstitutionalization of the seriously,
chronically mentally ill from large public institutions in the 1960s and
70s without an accompanying widespread commitment to support ad-
equate community treatment and housing entities to serve that depen-
dent population.7'
A different vision of the future of long term care in the U.S.
would entail a public policy of bolstering nursing homes and making
them more economically and programmatically viable entities than
65. See generally Marshall B. Kapp, Home Health Care Regulation: Is It Good for the Patient? 1
J. LONG TERM HOME HEALTH CARE 251, 251 (1999).
66. Regarding the regulation of assisted living facilities, see ROBERT L. MOLLICA, DEP'T
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, STATE ASSISTED LIVING POLICY- 1998 (1998); U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASSISTED LIVING: QUALrIY-OF-CARE AND CONSUMER PROTECTION IS-
SUES IN FOUR STATES, GAO-HEHS-99-27 (1999); see also generally Barry Meier, States See
Problems of Quality of Care at Centers forAged, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2000, at 1; Paul A. Gordon,
When a HandshakeJust Won't Do, PROVIDER, Apr. 1997, at 39; Kitty Buckwalter et al., Residen-
tial Care for Persons With Dementia: Are Codes and Regulations Protective or Counter-Productive?,
22 J. GERONTOLOGY NuRs. 43 (June 1996)
67. See ROSALIE A. KANE ET AL., THE HEART OF LONG-TERM CARE 17 (1998).
68. See N.A. KRAUSS & B.M. ALTMAN, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE POLICY AND RESEARCH
PUB. No. 99-0006, CHARACTERISTICS OF NURSING HOME RESIDENTS-1996 (1998).
69. Leslie S. Libow, Letter, Long-Term Care for the Frail Elderly, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 823,
824 (2000).
70. See Peter Uhlenberg, Replacing the Nursing Home, 128 PUB. INTEREST 73, 84 (1997).
Cf Keren Brown Wilson & Connie J. Baldwin, Are Nursing Homes Dinosaurs?, XIX GENERA-
TIONS 69, 69 (Winter 1995-96) (arguing that nursing homes "that do not reinvent them-
selves will not survive").
71. See generally GERALD N. GROB, THE MAD AMONGST Us: A HISTORY OF THE CARE OF
AMERICA'S MENTALLY ILL 287-300 (1994).
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they are today. As sub-issues to be considered under this general vi-
sion, the nursing home industry could be larger, smaller, or the same
size as it is presently, and could consist of either the current mix of
proprietary and nonprofit facilities or a different ownership profile.
One option might be a much smaller role for nursing homes in a total
long term care system that is more (but not completely) reliant on
home and community-based alternatives, in which the institutional
role is fulfilled exclusively by nonprofit facilities.
Successfully pursuing a policy of fostering more viable nursing
homes for those who need them, regardless of the eventual size and
ownership status of those facilities, would necessitate serious reexami-
nation of the status quo in at least two areas. First, there would need
to be a thorough and open-minded reassessment of the actual effec-
tiveness and value (including the cost/benefit ratio) of present regula-
tory and litigative approaches to assuring acceptable levels of quality
of care and quality of life in nursing homes. Second, the ways in
which we pay nursing homes for caring for residents must be critically
re-thought.7 2 This inquiry ought to address not just the technical, tor-
tuous aspects of Medicare and Medicaid payment methodologies, but
also fundamental questions regarding the proper mix of public and
private responsibility for financing long term care7 3 (including the
role to be played by the private long term care insurance industry)74
and the desirable ratio of spending between institutional and non-
institutional long term care. 75
V. CONCLUSION
This is a moment of great opportunities and challenges for influ-
encing the shape of long term care financing and delivery for a new
72. See KATHLEEN H. WILBER ET AL. EDS., A SECURE OLD AGE: APPROACHES To LONG-
TERM CARE FINANCING (1997).
73. See, e.g., MARK MERLIS, COMMONWEALTH FUND PUB. # 343, FINANCING LONG-TERM
CARE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ROLES (1999);Janet Weiner,
Financing Long-term Care: A Proposal by the American College of Physicians and the American Geri-
atrics Society, 271 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC'Y 1525, 1526 (1994) ("We believe that there are
appropriate roles for both the public and private sector in long-term care financing.").
74. See LES ABROMOVITZ, LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE MADE SIMPLE (1999). But see
Feder, Komisar, & Niefeld, supra note 13, at 51-54 (favoring expansion of social insurance
for long term care, rather than private insurance); see also generally Carroll L. Estes &
Thomas Bodenheimer, Paying for Long-Term Care, 160 WEST. J. MED. 64 (1994) (accord).
75. See Feder et al., supra note 11, at 49-50; PHOEBE L. BARTON, UNDERSTANDING THE
U.S. HEALTH SERVICES SYSTEM 319 (1999) ("Although 70 percent of all public and private
LTC expenditures are for institutional care, the majority of people who obtain LTC ser-
vices receive them in their residences or in community settings.").
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millennium.7 6 As we continue to contemplate how society may best
care for the most vulnerable and dependent in our midst, namely
those individuals who are so frail and debilitated that they are candi-
dates for institutional long term care, noble intentions are essential.
The religious and secular communities underlying and embodied in
nonprofit nursing homes and their governing boards have histori-
cally-at their very core-represented and promoted such noble inten-
tions. However, even the most meritorious intentions are severely
challenged today by a constellation of factors that combine to
threaten the continued vitality and viability of the U.S. nursing home
industry as a whole. How we deal with those factors, strategically and
pragmatically, will largely determine the shape of tomorrow's long
term care system in this nation and the role played within that system
by a nonprofit sector that American society can most ill afford to di-
minish or destroy.
76. See KANE ET AL., supra note 67, at 17; Marc A. Cohen, Emerging Trends in the Finance
and Delivery of Long-Term Care: Public and Private Opportunities and Challenges, 38 THE GERON-
TOLOGIST 80, 83, 85 (1998); Robert H. Binstock et al. eds., THE FUTURE OF LONG- TERM
CARE: SOCIAL AND POLICY ISSUES (1996).
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